Contemporary critics have argued that medieval philosophers have transmitted a concept of divine omnipotence that is self-contradictory. This study of the first Latin treatise on omnipotence places it in its patristic and early medieval context and demonstrates that for Peter Damian divine omnipotence stands beyond contradictiion.

Irven Michael Resnick - Jews and Christians in Twelfth-Century Europe - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 257-258 Book Review Jews and Christians in Twelfth-Century Europe Michael A. Signer and John Van Engen, editors. Jews and Christians in Twelfth-Century Europe. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001. Pp. xi + 380. Cloth, $49.95. Paper, $24.95. This volume, a collection of conference papers presented at Notre Dame in 1996, draws attention to the (...) twelfth-century renaissance for the evolution of medieval Jewish-Christian relations. Rather than treating the anti-Jewish violence of the first Crusade as a decisive break leading directly to Jewish isolation and, finally, expulsion from medieval Christendom, the editors have selected papers that seek "to integrate the Jewish and Jewish-Christian stories into a larger European story" focusing.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Before Science: The Invention of the Friars’ Natural Philosophy by Roger French, Andrew CunninghamIrven M. ResnickRoger French and Andrew Cunningham. Before Science: The Invention of the Friars’ Natural Philosophy. Hants, UK: Scolar Press, 1996. Pp. x + 298. Cloth, $68.95.This is a peculiar book that depicts thirteenth-century natural philosophy as wholly dependent on the theological interests of the mendicant orders. For the Friars, “Natural philosophy was a study (...) in which the central concerns were the detection, admiration and appreciation of God’s existence, goodness, providence, munificence, forethought and provision for His creation” (4). Although conceived as “a positive contribution to the discipline of the history of science” (3), the work begins and ends with the claim that medieval natural philosophers were not engaged in science.One difficulty is that the authors never make clear what they mean by science, although they evidently understand that it entails a repudiation of metaphysics and a doctrine of nature’s radical autonomy. Consequently, for French and Cunningham medieval “science” is a mythic construct of modern historians, since “[t]here was no scientific tradition (in the modern sense of the term ‘scientific’) of looking at nature in the thirteenth century, only a religio-political way of doing so” (273).Thus, when summarizing the accomplishments of Roger Bacon, they note that “[Bacon] has been credited, along with Grosseteste, with creating early ‘experimental science’. Bacon could not of course have been a ‘scientist’ because he lived in the wrong [End Page 623] age for this” (238). This seemingly casual conclusion is rather stunning not only in its own right, but also as a revelation of the authors’ own effort to disenfranchise medieval ‘scientists’ for having had the misfortune of living too soon.French and Cunningham propose that polemical or apologetical interests urged the Friars to study nature as a response to various heretics and especially the Cathars who, seemingly like moderns, sought to disengage the natural world from the Christian God, while using the vocabulary of Aristotle’s libri naturales. However this central argument demands better support. Since the authors can cite only one surviving Cathar text—De duobus principiis (ca. 1230)—almost everything known of this group is derived from anti-Cathar polemics. Based on this single text the authors can say no more than that it used “what looks very much like a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics or Metaphysics,” (134) but fail to identify more precisely its sources. It is clear that thirteenth-century orthodox polemics increasingly relied on Aristotelian materials, but the conclusion that natural philosophers did so only in response to heretics who beat them to the Aristotelian punch seems tendentious. The historian will likely remain unconvinced that the unparalleled translating activity of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries—the rendering into Latin of Arabic scientific knowledge (as in Constantine the African’s Pantegni or Adelard of Bath’s Quaestiones naturales), Greek medical literature (e.g. Galen’s Methodus medendi translated by Gerard of Cremona and Burgundio of Pisa) and mathematics (e.g. Euclid’s Optics, Theodosius’s Spherics, Archimedes’ On the Quadrature of the Circle, and Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos and Almagest) culminating with thirteenth-century translations of Aristotle’s biological works—should all have stemmed from a preoccupation with heresy.A further shortcoming of this book is the limited attention given to works on natural philosophy by the Friars themselves. The book’s first seven of eleven chapters explore the educational establishments in which natural philosophy arose: first monastic and cathedral schools, and then the universities. The works of individual Friars receive only the briefest summary. Among the Dominican natural philosophers Albertus Magnus—the patron saint of scientists and one of a very few scholastics to have commented on all of Aristotle’s biological works—is awarded only five pages. For his mastery of Aristotle’s libri naturales Albertus has been called “the dominant figure in Latin learning and natural science of the thirteenth century.” (Cf. Lynn Thorndike, History of Magic and Experimental Science [New York: Macmillan, 1929], 2:521) Albertus described not only the natural world but also explored the philosophical foundations for scientific knowledge. Yet curiously French and Cunningham give much more attention... (shrink)

This study provides a reappraisal of the eleventh-century controversy over the value of logic in theology on the basis of close exegesis of the central texts by Peter Damian, Lanfranc of Bec, Berengar of Tours and Anselm of Canterbury.

Odo of Tournai, the Phoenix, and the Problem of Universals IRVEN M. RESNICK OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS a good deal of attention has been focused on the philosophical literature of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries in an attempt to locate the origins of nominalism? As part of this effort, several scholars have attempted to come to a new and better appreciation of one of the most vilified figures of the late eleventh century, namely Roscelin of Com- pi~gne, (...) whose logical doctrine, sometimes described as "proto-nominalism" or "vocalism, ''2 represents an early stage in the development of twelfth-century logical thought. Some have attempted simply to reconstruct, on the basis of the little material available to us that describes Roscelin's views, a less polemical and more coherent account of his theory of universals.3 Others have attempted to identify additional writings -- both published and unpublished -- that may prop- erly shed light on Roscelin's philosophy.4 All, however, would agree on Roscelin's significance for the history of philosophy at the beginning of the twelfth-century renaissance. Roscelin's importance does not necessarily presuppose his originality. Evi- ' This effort has resulted in the dedication of an entire number of Vivarium to the origin and meaning of twelfth-century nominalism. Cf. Vivarium 3o/1 . For a discussion of various doctrines on universals that emerged before Abelard, see Augustine Thompson, "The Debate.. (shrink)